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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Respondent and Cross-Appellant,, Wendy Marie 
Rawlings, by and through counsel, hereby petitions this Court 
for a Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, the Honorable Judges Davidson, Garff, and 
Bench, entered on or about April 15, 1988* Plaintiff requests 
this Court to review the following issues: 
1« Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly apply the 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
<*UCCJA*>, Section 78-45c-l, et seq- , and the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in TRENT v. TRENT, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987) in 
determining if jurisdiction to hear Defendant's custody 
modification request in this action properly lies in Utah, or if 
the modification request should have been transferred to the 
State of Washington as requested by Plaintiff, especially in 
light of this Court's guidelines stated in KRAMER v. KRAMER, 738 
P«2d 624 (Utah 1987), regarding custody modification requests? 
2* Does this case present an important question of 
State law, i„e«, how district courts should determine 
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, which has not, but should be, 
settled by this Court? 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of t-he Court, of Appeals was published April 
.5, 1988, in 80 Utah Advanced Reports 25. A copy thereof is 
.ncluded in "the Appendix. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Wendy Rawlings requests "this review pursuant, "to Rule 43(2) 
and (4), Rules of "the Utah Supreme Court., on "the grounds "that, 
the Court, of Aptpeals* decision is in conflict wi"th a prior 
decision of "the U*tah Supreme Court, and t-he issues on appeal deal 
with an important, question of State law, which has not. been, but. 
should ber settled by this Court* 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah UCCJA, 78-45c-l, et seq., with special attention to 
Subsection 1(c), Section 3 and Subsections 7(3)(a)-(e>. (The 
Utah UCCJA is reproduced in the Appendix*) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties in the above-entitled action were married on 
August IS, 1974 and divorced on May 18, 1982 in the First 
District Court of Box Elder County, Utah, by the Honorable Omer 
J* Call. Plaintiff was awarded custody of the five children of 
the parties* Plaintiff was re-married to Mark Rawlings in 
September, 1982. 
Several Order to Show Cause hearings were held before 
Judge Call from the time of the divorce in 1982 to 1984, when 
Mrs. Rawlings and the children moved with her husband to the 
Seattle, Washington, area in or about June 1, 1984. Judge Call 
modified the visitation portion of the decree at a hearing held 
in October, 1984. 
Shelter care proceedings were held on or about April, 
1985, in the State of Washington pursuant to the emergency 
jurisdiction provisions of the Washington UCCJA, which is 
similar to the Utah UCCJA. 
In or about October, 1985, more than one year after 
Plaintiff and the children moved to Washington, Defendant, Mark 
Weiner, filed an Order to Show Cause in Utah petitioning for a 
modification of the divorce d&cr&& requesting the court to grant 
Weiner custody of the children* Plaintiff was served with the 
Order to Show Cause on or about December 5, 1985, almost one and 
one-half years after Plaintiff moved to Washington* 
Plaintiff thereafter filed in both Washington and Utah 
Motions to Trans^f&T Jurisdiction of the case to Washington 
pursuant to the UCCJA to determine Defendant's custody 
modification request* 
After communications between Judge Call and Washington 
Family Law Commissioner Stephen Gaddis, which were initiated by 
the Washington Court, Judge Call denied the request in Utah 
transfer jurisdiction, ostensibly because Washington had refused 
jurisdiction* However, it has been indicated by the Washington 
court on numerous occassions, including the Order by 
Commissioner Gaddis denying Plaintiff's request for Washington 
to asssume jurisdiction, that Washington was at all times ready 
to accept jurisdiction of the case* (See copies of Washington 
orders attached in Appendix*) The only reason Washington 
declined jurisdiction was because Judge Call refused to 
relinquish jurisdiction* It appears that Judge Call mistakenly 
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indicated that Washington had declined jurisdiction of its own 
accord* 
A hearing was then held on Defendant's custody 
modification request on May 20, 21, and 22, whereafter Judge 
Call amended the Decree granting Defendant joint legal custody, 
but leaving physical custody with Plaintiff as stated in the 
Decree- Weiner initially appealed Judge Call's decision to the 
Court of Appeals at which time Rawlings cross-appealed solely on 
jurisdictional grounds* Weiner*s appeal was later dismissed for 
failure to proceed* 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on the 
jurisdictional issue affirming the trial court* The Court of 
Appeals apparently based its decision on the incorrect statement 
of Judge Call that Washington had declined jurisdiction and on 
the case of TRENT v* TRENT, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah, 1987), wherein 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Utah County District Court's 
refusal to transfer jurisdiction to Idaho, where the wife had 
lived for approximately five years, of a modification request to 
determine visitation rights* 
ARGUMENTS 
I* 
PLAINTIFF BELIEVES THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
DECIDED THIS CASE CONTRARY TO THE UTAH UCCJA AND 
CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S OPINION IN TRENT v. TRENT* 
A, The TRENT case dealt solely with a determination of 
visitation rights and not custody. 
The divorce decree in the TRENT case was entered in Utah 
County on or about January 15, 1980* Defendant, Mrs. Trent, who 
was living in Idaho at the time, was awarded custody of the 
parties six minor children subject to reasonable rights of 
visitation by plaintiff* In May of 1985, plaintiff filed an 
order* to show cause requesting the court to enforce the 
visitation and to modify the decree to more specifically define 
visitation. Defendant then requested the court to dismiss the 
order to show cause stating that she had lived in Ada County, 
Idaho, from July 16, 1979, prior to the divorce, and was served 
with the divorce papers while living in Idaho, She further 
stated that she had lived in Idaho from the time of the decree 
and that the children had never lived in Utah. The trial court 
refused to dimiss the order to show cause, concluding that since 
the issue was limited to visitation in contrast to custody, the 
Utah forum was not inconvenient. Thereafter, the parties 
entered a stipulation regarding visitation. 
This Court stated in TRENT: 
First, notwithstanding the fact that the CUtah 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction! Act broadly 
defines "custody determination* as including 
visitation rights, the issue here is not one of 
custody in any sense of the word. Furthermore, no 
substantial issue is presented concerning the 
visitation to be afforded to Plaintiff. In fact, 
Defendant's affidavit does not frame any contested 
issues regarding either Plaintiff's right to visit at 
specified times and places or- any adverse effect such 
visits might have upon the best interests of the 
children. Under these circumstances, to compel 
Plaintiff to seek enforcement of visitation rights in 
Idaho does not comport to the obvious purpose and 
intent of forum non conveniens espoused in the Act. 
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Second, Defendant made no showing of prejudice or 
that the interests of the children would best be 
served by relinquishing jurisdiction to Idaho-
Defendant also made no showing that needed evidence 
was more readily available in Idaho* On the 
contrary, the court having denied the motion to 
dismiss, the parties promptly stipulated the basis 
for the court's modification of the decree to permit 
specific visitation periods. 735 P.2d at 383. 
(Emphasis added) 
EL The instant action deals primarily with custody. 
In direct contrast with TRENT, the case at bar dealt 
primarily with custody and Defendant's request filed in Utah to 
uodify the Decree to grant him custody of the parties' five 
ninor children* This Court allowed the decision in the TRENT 
rase to stand only because that case dealt with minor visitation 
rights and did not deal with custody. Had TRENT dealt with 
custody, the opinion clearly suggests that it may very well have 
been d<BC±d<ed differently and in favor of Mrs. Trent, which would 
also be the decision requested by Mrs. Rawlings in the instant 
case. Therefore, the decision of the Corut of Appeals is in 
direct conflict with the decision of this Court in TRENT. 
C- This case is further distinguished from TRENT in 
that there are specific contested issues and Plaitniff herein 
has made a clear showing of prejudice* 
The instant case also clearly shows that the interests of 
the children would be better served by relinquishing 
jurisdiction to Washington and that it is severely prejudicial 
to both Plaintiff and the children to refuse to do so. The 
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children had been in Washington for approximately two years at 
the time the hearing was held in Utah in May, 1986* The only 
connection Utah has with the children is their father, (the 
Defendant) and maternal grandparents* All other connections are 
found in Washington, e* g- friends, neighbors, school teachers, 
principals, church leaders, doctors, therapists, psychologists, 
etc. In fact, Mr* Weiner elected, at considerable expense, to 
bring the Washington court-appointed psychologist from Seattle 
to Utah in order to testify at the hearing* Plaintiff was 
simply unable to call many witnesses that would otherwise have 
been available if the matter had been heard in Washington, 
D* The decision of the Court of Appeals is contrary to 
Utah law as stated in the Utah UCCJA. 
The exercise of jurisdiction by the Utah Court also 
seriously contravenes the purposes stated in the Utah UCCJA. 
One purp^ose of the UCCJA is to " * * * assure that litigation 
concerning the custody of the child take place ordinarily in the 
state with which the child and his family have the closest 
connections and where the significant evidence concerning his 
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most 
readily available and that the courts of this state [should] 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his 
family have a closer connection with another state* UCA Section 
73-45C-l(c>* 
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The Weiner children and the Plaintiff certainly have a 
nuch closer connection now with Washington than with Utah* It 
is therefore incumbent upon the Utah courts, in order to conform 
to the UCCJA, to ±TBTIB±BT- jurisdiction of the case to Washington 
fhere almost all of the evidence exists* Judge Call may have 
Deen familiar with the parties, but was not able to hear all of 
the evidence because the evidence could not be brought from 
Washington* 
It must also be s-tTBSS&d that this is not the typical 
situation envisioned by the drafters of the UCCJA where one 
uarty seeks to deprive the other party of certain rights by 
noving to another state and requiring the responding party, who 
is still living in the dBCTB& state, to dlend long distance* 
Defendant initiated this action* He should be held to the 
standards defeined in the UCCJA to establish and determine 
jurisdiction to modify the custody decree, which require that 
this action be heaard in the state with the closest connections, 
in this case, the State of Washington* 
E* The decision of the Court of Appeals is also 
contrary to the guidelines established by this Corut in custody 
nodification actions as stated in KRAMER v* KRAMER* 
The necessity of custody modification hearings taking 
ulace in the state with the closest connections becomes all the 
nore imperative in light of this Court's recent rulings and 
iirections regarding custody modification hearings as outlined 
in KRAMER v* KRAMER, 738 P*2d 624 <Utah, 1987), wherein this 
a 
Court has stated that the trial court, when dealing with a 
request for modification of an earlier custody order, must first 
determine that there has been a substantial change of 
circumstances to reopen the custody decree and that n . . . 
ordinarily the trial court must focus exclusively on the 
parenting ability of the custodial parent and the functioning of 
the established custodial relationships, " 738 P.2d at 626 The 
trial court can only focus exclusively on the parenting ability 
of the custodial parent and the functioning of the custodial 
relationship in a situation similar to the instant action when 
that hearing is held in the state with the closest connection to 
the children and the custodial parent, in this case the State of 
Washington. 
The trial court in this case simply could not comply with 
the guidlines established in KRAMER becuase there was no way to 
provide sufficient evidence in Utah when almost all of the 
evidence is in Washington* If Defendant wants to request a 
custody -modification, let him go the the forum where the 
evidence e::ists and the case can be properly d^cld^d. 
II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT 
QUESTION OF STATE LAW, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, 
BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT. 
Since TRENT did not deal with modification of a custody 
order pursuant to the UCCJA, the instant case is a case of first 
impression in Utah. As currently stated by the Court of 
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Court, which stayed the Superior Court proceedings in order to 
hear her petition. 
In reaching the first issue, whether the Alaska trial 
court had jurisdiction to hear the modification petition, the 
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that even though the trial court had 
the continuing right to modify custody decrees, the trial court 
MUST ALWAYS DETERMINE WHETHER JURISDICTION EXISTS IN ORDER TO 
MODIFY A DECREE <641 P.2d 17). The opinion clearly deliniates 
that the trial court must always determine if it meets the 
jurisdictional prerequisites of Section 3 of the UCCJA. In the 
instant case, at no time did the trial court ever indicate that 
it had considered the jurisdictional requirements of the Utah 
UCCJA* 
In determining if the Alaska Superior Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3 of the UCCJA, (which is 
similar to the Utah UCCJA except for the "significant 
connection" requirement), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that 
since the wife had recently moved from the State of Washington 
and was currently residing in California at the time the 
petition was filed, and since California was not the "home 
state", the child having resided in California for less than si:c 
months, no other state had jurisdiction at the relevant time. 
The Alaska Supreme Court seems to have reluctantly held that the 
trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection <a)<4) of 
Section 3 of the UCCJA because no other state appeared to have 
jurisdiction. It can be easily read into the holding as dictum 
that if the wife had either continued to reside in Washington 
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The opinion of -the Alaska Supreme Court, is veil reasoned, 
complies with the purpose and provisions of the UCCJA, and 
further appears to be in harmony with this Court's decisions in 
TRENT and KRAMER. Furthermore, this court certainly did not 
intend in the TRENT case that Utah would always retain 
jurisdiction as long as one of the parties resided in Utah. 
Therefore, this court should review the instant case in an 
effort to establish guidelines in future cases and for members 
of the bar when dealing with modification of a custody order in 
a Utah divorce decree when the custodial parent no longer 
resides in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears quite clearly that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals in this matter is in conflict of the decision of this 
Court in TRENT and the guidelines established in KRAMER. It 
also appears that the decision of the Appeals Court may be in 
conflict with the purpose and intent of the UCCJA* These are 
important legal issues which should be determined and clarified 
by this Court. 
Therefore, this Court should grant Plaintiff's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of 
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Mark Douglas Weiner, 
Defendant, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Bench.-
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860274-CA 
F I L E D 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Tin/othy M Snea 
rterk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff Wendy Rawlings (Rawlings) appeals from the 
district court's modification of her divorce decree, claiming 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree 
because of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 
in effect in both Utah and Washington. We affirm. 
Defendant Mark Weiner (Weiner) and Rawlings were married 
August 16, 1974, in Manti, Utah. The parties had five children 
as issue of their marriage. The parties were divorced on May 
18, 1982, by the Honorable Omer J. Call of the First District 
Court of Box Elder County, Utah. The original decree was later 
amended on September 27, 1982, by Judge Call. Rawlings was 
awarded custody of the parties' five children while Weiner was 
awarded carefully enunciated visitation rights with the minor 
children. In December 1982, Rawlings remarried. 
From 1982 to 1984 Weiner initiated several proceedings to 
enforce the visitation order in the divorce decree, and each 
time the judge ordered the parties to comply with the order.1 
1. All hearings were before Judge Call. The orders on the 
order to show cause enumerated here dealt exclusively with 
compliance of visitation rights. The orders by Judge Call were: 
November 17, 1982; May 16, 1983; February 16, 1984; May 29, 1984 
In June 1984, Rawlings sent a letter to Weiner informing 
him that she and the children had moved to Mthe Des Moines area" 
and could be reached at a Utah post office box, Rawlings moved 
to Washington in June of 1984.2 During the summer of 1984, 
Weiner initiated several additional proceedings in an attempt tc 
locate his children.3 
In October 1984, another hearing was held and the court 
found that Rawlings1 move constituted a substantial change in 
circumstances allowing modification of the visitation provisions 
in the divorce decree. 
In April 1985, a shelter care hearing was held in 
Washington, pursuant to emergency jurisdiction provided for in 
the Washington UCCJA, to determine allegations of child abuse 
made by Rawlings against Weiner. Commissioner Gaddis of the 
Washington court noted that the Washington court orders were 
temporary and any permanent adjudication or realignment of the 
parties had to come from Utah, until the Utah court declined 
jurisdiction. 
In October 1985, Weiner filed an order to show cause in 
Utah. In November 1985, Rawlings petitioned for transfer of 
jurisdiction from Utah to Washington. Pursuant to Rawlings' 
transfer request, Commissioner Gaddis contacted the court in 
Utah and after discussion with Judge Call declined to accept 
jurisdiction in Washington. Commissioner Gaddis urged the Utah 
court to retain jurisdiction to enforce or modify custody and 
visitation orders. 
On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a statement and 
order and certified the matters of disqualification and 
jurisdiction to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First Distric 
Court of Utah for determination. Judge Christoffersen denied 
Rawlings' motion to disqualify Judge Call, denied the Motion to 
Change Jurisdiction, and set a hearing date in May 1986, for thi 
order to show cause. On October 21, 1986, the findings of fact 
conclusions of law, and order on the order to show cause were 
entered by the court. The court found Rawlings in contempt for 
continuing to use "Rawlings" as the children's last name after 
being ordered not to do so, modified the visitation order and 
ordered that the parties have joint custody of the children, 
with Rawlings maintaining physical custody. 
2. The "Des Moines area" referred to in the letter turned out 
to be a suburb of Seattle, Washington. 
3. Weiner's continued attempt to locate his children resulted 
in additional orders by Judge Cal1 on July 26, 1984 and August 
8, 1984. 
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Weiner timely appealed the October 21, 1986 order. 
Rawlings cross-appealed on grounds that the First District Court 
lacked jurisdiction. Weiner1s appeal was dismissed for lack of 
prosecution by order of this Court on June 9, 1987. 
Before addressing the issue of jurisdiction it is important 
to note that there is no transcript of the May 1986 hearing. 
Rawlings refers to continuing objections to jurisdiction made at 
the May hearing. There is no record of these objections as 
Rawlings requested no transcript. As held in Fackrell v. 
Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987): 
Appellate review of factual matters can be 
meaningful/ orderly, and intelligent only 
in juxtaposition to a record by which 
lower courts' rulings and decisions on 
disputes can be measured. In this case 
without a transcript no such record was 
available, and therefore no measurement of 
the district court's action can be made as 
urged upon us by defendant. 
Id. at 1319-20 (quoting Sawvers v. Sawvers, 558 P.2d 607, 608-09 
(Utah 1976)). Without "adequate citations to the record, the 
judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct." 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d at 1319. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1987) provides: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and 
their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
This statute establishes continuing jurisdiction in the First 
District Court of Box Elder County as the court granting the 
decree of divorce. Rawlings argues that notwithstanding the 
continuing jurisdiction, under the Utah UCCJA, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-45C-1 to 26 (1987), this state is an inconvenient forum. 
Section 78-45c-3(l) states: 
A court of this state which is competent 
to decide child custody matters has 
jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in 
any of the following paragraphs are met: 
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(a) This state (i) is the home state of 
the chi^ ld at the time of commencement 
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been 
the child's home state within six 
months before commencement of the 
proceeding and the child is absent 
from this state because of his 
removal or retention by a person 
claiming his custody or for other 
reasons, and a parent or person 
acting as parent continues to live in 
this state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state 
assume jurisdiction because (i) the 
child and his parents, or the child 
and at least one contestant, have a 
significant connection with this 
state, and (ii) there is available in 
this state substantial evidence 
concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in 
this state and (i) the child has been 
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in 
an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse 
or is otherwise neglected or 
dependent; or 
(d) (i) It appears that no other state 
would have jurisdiction under 
prerequisites substantially in 
accordance with Paragraphs (a), (b), 
or (c), or another state has declined 
to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that this state is the more 
appropriate forum to determine the 
custody of the child, and (ii) it is 
in the best interest of the child 
that this court assume jurisdiction. 
Section 78-45c-3(3) states: 
Physical presence of the child, while 
desirable, is not a prerequisite for 
jurisdiction to determine his custody. 
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Section 78-45c-7(3) states: 
In determining if it is an 
inconvenient forum, the court shall 
consider if it is in the interest of 
the child that another state assume 
jurisdiction. For this purpose it 
may take into account the following 
factors/ among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was 
the child's home state; 
(b) if another state has a closer 
connection with the child and his 
family or with the child and one or 
more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships is more readily 
available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another 
forum which is no less appropriate; 
and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
court of this state would contravene 
any of the purposes stated in 
§ 78-45C-1. 
The UCCJA does not mandate loss of jurisdiction to the 
original state in all cases. Only if Utah chooses to 
relinquish jurisdiction, based on the best interests of the 
children, will such jurisdiction transfer.4 In Trent v. 
Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's authority under the Utah UCCJA in 
declining to relinquish jurisdiction to Idaho. In Trent the 
4. It may be argued that jurisdiction may be obtained through 
the emergency provision in section 78-45c-3(l)(c) as was done in 
this case. However, accepting such jurisdiction on an emergency 
basis does not give permanent jurisdiction. The court is still 
required to contact the original state court to determine which 
court is most convenient and best serves the interests of the 
children and the parties. 
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children had neither lived in nor had any contacts with the 
State of Utah, unlike the children in this case. While Trent 
dealt exclusively with enforcement of visitation, it makes 
clear that the UCCJA is not mandatory. 
The facts show that Washington specifically declined to 
exercise jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present 
involvement with the matter. The judge in Utah and 
commissioner in Washington conferred and determined that Utah 
was the more appropriate forum and that Utah would continue to 
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and 
visitation of the parties' children. This is precisely the 
position described in section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i).5 We hold 
that the First District Court appropriately retained 
jurisdiction under the Utah UCCJA to make any determinations 
regarding custody, visitation or other matters relevant to the 
children. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
BENCH, Judge: (Concurring) 
For me, the instant case presents a very narrow question: 
How does a state's continuing jurisdiction in a divorce case 
mesh with foreign jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979)? I believe the 
5. Section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i) is the same version as used by 
Judge Call in December 1985. 
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question is answered by section 14(1) of UCCJA,1 which was 
not mentioned by the majority but provides as follows: 
If a court of another state has made 
a custody decree, a court of this state 
shall not modify that decree unless (a) it 
appears to the court of this state that 
the court which rendered the decree does 
not now have jurisdiction under 
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially 
in accordance with this act or has 
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify 
the decree and (b) the court of this state 
has jurisdiction. 
The Commissioner's note to section 14 explains the 
circumstances under which jurisdiction would shift: 
Courts which render a custody decree 
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the decree under local law. Courts 
in other states have in the past often 
assumed jurisdiction to modify the 
out-of-state decree themselves without 
regard to the preexisting jurisdiction of 
the other state. In order to achieve 
greater stability of custody arrangements 
and avoid forum shopping, subsection (a) 
declares that other states will defer to 
the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
of another state as long as that state has 
jurisdiction under the standards of this 
Act. In other words, all petitions for 
modification are to be addressed to the 
prior state if that state has sufficient 
contact with the case to satisfy section 
3. The fact that the court had previously 
considered the case may be one factor 
favoring its continued jurisdiction. If, 
however, all the persons involved have 
moved away or the contact with the state 
has otherwise become slight, modification 
jurisdiction would shift elsewhere. 
1. In Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987); in 
Washington, RCWA 26.27.140 (1986). 
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9 U.L.A. at 154 (citation omitted). 
The Reporter for the Special Committee preparing the UCCJA 
was even more specific when she noted the following: 
A typical example is the case of the 
couple who are divorced in state A, their 
matrimonial home state, and whose children 
are awarded to the wife, subject to 
visitation rights of the husband. Wife 
and children move to state B, with or 
without permission of the court to remove 
the children. State A has continuing 
jurisdiction and the courts in state B may 
not hear the wife's petition to make her 
the sole custodian, eliminate visitation 
rights, or make any other modification of 
the decree, even though state B has in the 
meantime become the Hhome state- under 
section 3. The jurisdiction of state A 
continues and is exclusive as long as the 
husband lives in state A unless he loses 
contact with the children, for example, by 
not using his visitation privileges for 
three years. 
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A 
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 
22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969) (quoted in State ex rel. 
Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Tenn. 1985)). 
Under the facts of this case, Utah's jurisdiction over 
custody issues was primary and Washington's jurisdiction was 
secondary. The parties were divorced in Utah. Rawlings 
subsequently moved to Washington, taking the children with 
her. Weiner remained in Utah, and continually sought 
enforcement of his visitation rights under the Utah decree. At 
Rawlings' request, Washington took emergency jurisdiction under 
UCCJA. On discovering that Utah had continuing jurisdiction 
over custody, Washington declined any further jurisdiction 
under section 14(1). That was precisely what should have 
happened under UCCJA. Because Utah had primary jurisdiction 
over custody of the children, I concur in affirming the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Russell W. Bench, Ju^fge^^^1-^ 
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effect, the order will not take effect until a determination is made at the hear-
The administrative law judge shall remind the payee of visitation rights of 
payor and under proper circumstances the administrative law judge may make 
»ort payments conditional upon the child's custodian making the child available 
the exercise of visitation rights. Hearings shall be granted and conducted in 
rdance with section 78-45b-6. 
the department's application for an order to withhold and deliver is granted, 
py of the order will be served upon the obligor's employer or payer of earnings 
ertified mail, return receipt requested. 
the event there is in the possession of any employer or payer of earnings any 
lings subject to the department 's order to withhold and deliver, such earnings 
1 be withheld immediately upon receipt of the order and shall be forwarded 
le department or other designee. 
) Every person, firm, corporation, association, political subdivision, or depart-
t of the state shall honor according to its terms, the department's order to 
lhold and deliver, or a duly executed assignment of earnings whether executed 
ntarily or pursuant to an order which is presented by the department as a plan 
atisfy or retire a support debt or obligation. This requirement to honor the 
ir tment 's order to withhold and deliver the assignment of earnings and the 
gnment of earnings itself shall be applicable whether said earnings are to be 
I presently or in the future and shall continue in force and effect until released 
writing by the department. Any order or assignment made pursuant to this sub-
ion shall have the same priority against the obligor as a claim for taxes. Pay-
it of moneys pursuant to an order or assignment of earnings presented by the 
artment shall serve as full acquittance under any contract of employment, and 
state shall defend the employer and hold him harmless for any action taken 
3uant to the assignment of earnings. The department shall be released from 
ility for improper receipt of moneys under an assignment of earnings upon 
irn of any moneys so received. 
I) No employer may discharge or prejudice any employee by reason of the fact. 
t his earnings have been subjected to support lien, wage assignment or garnish-
it for any indebtedness under this act. This subsection shall not preclude termi-
ion of an obligor who is an employee for other causes. 
>) Should any person discharge an employee in violation of subsection (4), that 
son shall be liable to the employee for such damages as he may suffer, together 
h costs, interest, and attorneys' fees, or a maximum of $1,000, whichever is 
er. 
>) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual 
any work pay period which may be subjected to a support lien or garnishment 
mforce payment of a judgment arising out of failure to support dependent chil-
n may not exceed 50% of his disposable earnings for the work pay period. 
0 Whenever a support lien or garnishment is served upon any person, assert-
a support debt against earnings and there is in the possession of such person 
such earnings, 50% of the disposable earnings shall be disbursed to the debtor 
jther such earnings are paid, or are to be paid weekly, monthly or at other regu-
intervals and whether there be due the debtor earnings for one week or for 
Dnger period. The support lien or garnishment shall continue to operate and 
uire said person to withhold the nonexempt portion of earnings at each succeed-
earnings disbursement interval until released in writing from the department. 
istory: C. 1953, 78-45b-13, enacted by L. 
>, ch. 96, §13; L. 1977, ch. 145, §9; 1982, 
32, § 2. 
nailer's Notes. 
allow the department to issue orders requir-
ing the withholding and delivery of earnings 
of a responsible parent. For prior version, see 
parent volume. 
C H A P T E R 45c 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Section 
78-45c-l. Purposes — Construction. 
78-45c-2. Definitions. 
78-45c-3. Rases of jurisdiction in this state. 
78-45c-4. Persons to he notified and heard. 
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state — Proof of service — Submission to jurisdiction. 
78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction not exercised — Inquiry to other 
state — Information exchange — Stay of proceeding on notice of another pro-
ceeding. 
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum — Factors in determina-
tion — Communication with other court — Awarding costs. 
78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction — Notice to another 
jurisdiction — Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to return child 
— Awarding costs. 
78-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and litigation concerning required in pleadings 
— Verification — Continuing duty to inform court. 
78-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or claiming custody or visitation rights. 
78-45c-ll. Ordering party to appear — Enforcement -— Out-of-state party — Travel expense. 
78-45c-12. Parties bound hy custody decree — Conclusive unless modified. 
78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees. 
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree — Prerequisites — Factors considered. 
78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree — Effect — Enforcement — Award of expenses. 
78-45c-16. Registry maintained hy clerk of court — Documents entered. 
78-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished by clerk of court. 
78-45c-18. Taking testimony of persons in other states. 
78-45c-19. Request to court of another state to take evidence, to make studies or to order 
appearance of party — Payment of costs. 
78-45c-20. Taking evidence for use in court of another state — Ordering appearance in 
another state — Enforcement — Costs. 
78-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceedings — Furnishing copies to other state courts. 
78-45c-22. Requesting court records from another state. 
78-45c-23. Foreign countries — Application of general policies. 
78-45c-24. Priority on court calendar. 
78-45c-25. Notices — Orders to appear — Manner of service. 
78-45c-26. Short title. 
78-45c-l. Purposes — Construction. (1) The general purposes of this act are 
to: 
(a) Avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other states in 
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children 
from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being; 
l^%f)^ Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a cus-
tody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest 
of the child; 
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily 
in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and 
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with 
another state; 
(d) Discourage continuing controvers ies over child custody in the interest of 
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the 
child; 
) Promote ana expand tne excnange or inrormation anu oiner lorms ui mutual 
stance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with 
same child; and 
I To make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
) This title shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this 
ion. 
story: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 1. when the parties live in different jurisdic-
tions; providing for recognition of child cus-
; of Act. t0( |y determinations made by other jurisdic-
l act relating to child custody; providing tions; providing for enforcement of child cus-
mactment of the Uniform Child Custody tody de te rmina t ions and minimizing the 
sdiction Act; providing procedures for necessity for repetitious litigation. -~ Laws 
determination of child custody issues 1980, ch. 41. 
$-45c-2. Definitions. As used in this act: 
) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to cus-
r or visitation rights with respect to a child; 
:) "Custody d e t e r m i n a t i o n " means a court decision and court orders and 
ructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation rights; it does 
include a decision relating to child support or any other monetary obligation 
ny person; 
I) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a custody determination 
ne of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of marriage, or legal sepa-
on, and includes child neglect and dependency proceedings; 
L) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determination contained in 
idicial decree or order made in a custody proceeding, and includes an initial 
*ee and a modification decree; 
>) "Home state" means the state in which the child immediately preceding the 
B involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for 
east six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months 
the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. 
iods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part 
he six-month or other period; 
i) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning a particular child; 
r) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which modifies or replaces a 
»r decree, whether made by the court which rendered the prior decree or by 
ther court; 
\) "Physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child; 
I) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has 
sical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by the court 
laims a right to custody; and 
0) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the 
imonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. 
istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, §2. 
S-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. (1) A court of this state which 
ompetent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child cus-
? determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth 
ny of the following paragraphs are met: 
t) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement 
he proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within six months before 
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(Dj i t is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume juris-
diction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contes-
tant, have a significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is available in 
this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protec-
tion, training, and personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in this state and (i) the child has been aban-
doned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has 
been subjected to or threatened with mis t rea tment or abuse or is otherwise 
neglected or dependent; or \ 
(d) (i) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequi-
sites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or another state 
has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground tha t this state is the more 
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best 
interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
(2) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (1), physical presence in 
this state of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child custody determi-
nation. 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a p re requis i te for 
jurisdiction to determine his custody. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 3. 
78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and heard. Before making a decree under this 
act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, 
any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any 
person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside 
this state, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to section 
78-45c-5. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 4. 
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state — Proof of service — Submission 
to jurisdiction. (1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person 
outside this state shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual 
notice, and may be made in any of the following ways: 
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the manner prescribed for service 
of process within this state; 
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is 
made for service of process in that place in an action in any of its courts of general 
jurisdiction; 
(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting 
a receipt; or 
(d) As directed by the court (including publication, if other means of notifica-
tion are ineffective). 
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, delivered, or last published 
at least 10 days before any hearing in this state. 
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual 
who made the service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the 
order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the 
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is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the 
je or other evidence of delivery to the addressee. 
Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 
y: L. 1980, ch. 41, §5. 
c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction not exercised — 
/ to other state — Information exchange — Stay of p roceeding on 
of another proceed ing . (1) A court of this state shall not exercise its 
lion under this act if a t the time of filing the petition a proceeding concern-
custody of the child was pending in a court of another state exercising 
:tion substantially in conformity with this act, unless the proceeding is 
by the court of the other state because this state is a more appropriate 
or for other reasons. 
Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine 
adings and other information supplied by the parties under section 78-45c-10 
all consult the child custody registry established under section 78-45c-16 con-
y the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child in other states. If 
art has reason to believe that proceedings may be pending in another state 
1 direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or other appropriate offi-
the other state. 
If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding tha t a proceed-
ncerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the 
assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the 
in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be 
ed in the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in 
iance with sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of this state has 
a custody decree before being informed of a pending proceeding in a court 
other s tate it shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the court 
ormed that a proceeding was commenced in another state after it assumed 
liction it shall likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues may 
igated in the more appropriate forum. 
tory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 6. 
45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum — Fac-
in determination — Communication with other court — Awarding costs. 
A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or modifica-
decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree 
finds tha t it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under 
ircumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropri-
orum. 
i A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion 
pon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the 
) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if 
in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this 
>ose it may take into account the following factors, among others: 
) If another state is or recently was the child's home state; 
) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or 
i the child and one or more of the contestants; 
) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protec-
i ~-i~*:~„oV,;™c IQ more readilv available in another state; 
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any 
of the purposes stated in section 78-45c-l. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may 
communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to 
the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that jurisdic-
tion will be exercised by the more appropriate court and tha t a forum will be avail-
able to the parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of 
another state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it 
may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly 
commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions
 Nwhich may be 
just and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent 
and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum, \ 
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody 
determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while 
retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding. 
(7) If it appears to the court tha t it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may 
require the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs 
of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including 
attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made 
to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall 
inform the court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the 
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, shall 
t ransmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate official 
for forwarding to the appropriate court. 
(9) Any communication received from another state informing this state of a 
finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate 
forum shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming 
jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the original court of this fact. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 7. 
78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jur isdic t ion — 
Notice to another jurisdiction — Ordering petitioner to appear in other court 
or to return child — Awarding costs. (1) If the petitioner for an initial decree 
has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar 
reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes 
of adjudication of custody if this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without 
consent of the person entitled to custody has improperly removed the child from 
the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained 
the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If 
the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state 
the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under 
the circumstances. 
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an initial 
custody decree pursuant to subsection (1), the court shall notify the parent or other 
appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in 
the other state. If a request to that effect is received from the other state, the 
court shall order the petitioner to appear with the child in a custody proceeding 
:~~m„<r„A ;« f^ 0 Mhar Qtatft in accordance with section 78~45c-20. If no such request 
» ; Y Y l l C i C L U C t U U U 1 C 1 U D C 3 LU a O S U I I l C J U I 1 3 U I V , 1 1 U 1 I HJ U I U U I I J WH> V>Wto l.v/v« J uv,Vsl *>v, 
mother state pursuant to subsection (2) or pursuant to section 78-45c-14, the 
rt shall notify the person who has legal custody under the decree of the other 
te and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other state 
may order the petitioner to return the child to the person who has legal cus-
y. If it appears that the order will be ineffective and the legal custodian is ready 
receive the child within a period of a few days, the court may place the child 
i foster care home for such period, pending return of the child to the legal custo-
n. At the same time, the court shall advise the petitioner that any petition for 
jification of custody must be directed to the appropriate court of the other state 
ich has continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines jurisdic-
1, to a court in a state which has jurisdiction pursuant to section 78-45c-3. 
5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may 
rge the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including attorney's 
5 and the cost of returning the child to another state. 
[istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 8. 
8-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and l i t igat ion concerning 
[uired in pleadings — Verification — Continuing duty to inform court. 
Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading or in an affidavit 
ached to that pleading shall give information under oath as to the child's 
sent address, the places where the child has lived within the last five years, 
I the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived 
ing that period. In this pleading or affidavit every party shall further declare 
ler oath as to each of the following whether: 
a) He has participated, as a party, witness, or in any other capacity, in any 
er litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or any other state; 
b) He has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending 
i court of this or any other state; and 
c) He knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who has physical 
tody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect to 
child. 
2) If the dec lara t ion as to any of the above items is in the affirmative the 
larant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. 
$ court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information 
nished and as to other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the dis-
ition of the case. 
3) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody pro-
ding concerning the child in this or any other state of which he obtained infor-
tion during this proceeding. 
istory: L. 1980, ch. 41. §9. 
8-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or claiming custody or visita-
i rights. If the court learns from information furnished by the parties pursuant 
section 78-45c-9 or from other sources that a person not a party to the custody 
ceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation 
i ts with respect to the child, it shall order that person to be joined as a party 
I to be duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of his joinder as 
arty. If the person joined as a party is outside this state he shall be served 
h process or otherwise notified in accordance with section 78-45c-5. 
istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 10. 
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tody of the child the court may order that he appear personally with the child 
If the party who is ordered to appear with the child cannot be served or fails t( 
obey the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue i 
warrant of arrest against such party to secure his appearance with the child. 
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is outside 
this state with or without the child the court may order that the notice given undei 
section 78-45c-5 include a statement directing that party to appear personally with 
or without the child and declaring that failure to appear may result in a decisior 
adverse to that party. 
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appeal 
under subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before the court with or with-
out the child, the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of the courl 
travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of the child ii 
this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §11. 
78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree — Conclusive unless modified, 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction under 
section 78-45c-3, binds all parties who have been served in this state or notified 
in accordance with section 78-45c-5 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties 
the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as 
to the custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified 
pursuant to law, including the provisions of this act. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §12. 
78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees. The courts of 
this state shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court 
of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions sub-
stantially in accordance with this act or which was made under factual circum-
stances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so long as this decree has 
not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar 
to those of this act. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §13. 
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree — Prerequisites — Factors con-
sidered. (1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this 
state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state 
that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under 
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or has declined 
to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of this state has juris-
diction. 
(2) If a court of this state is au thor ized under subsection (1) and section 
78-45c-8 to modify a custody decree of another state it shall give due consideration 
to the transcript of the record and other documents of all previous proceedings 
submitted to it in accordance with section 78-45c-22. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 14. 
78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree — Effect — Enforcement — Award of 
expenses. (1) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed 
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he office of the clerk of any district court of this state. The clerk shall treat 
decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the district court of this 
e. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in like 
iner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state. 
!) A person violating a custody decree of another state which makes it neces-
1 to enforce the decree in this state may be required to pay necessary travel 
other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the party entitled to the 
,ody or his witnesses. 
istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 15. 
8-45c-16. Registry mainta ined by clerk of cour t — Documents entered. 
1
 clerk of each district court shall maintain a registry in which he shall enter 
of the following: 
L) Certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing; 
I) Communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other states; 
3) Communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a court of 
>ther state; and 
1) Other communica t ions or documents concerning custody proceedings in 
ither state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this state or the dispo-
on to be made by it in a custody proceeding. 
[istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 16. 
8-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished by c lerk of cour t . The clerk 
a district court of this state, at the request of the court of another state or 
the request of any person who is affected by or has a legitimate interest in a 
tody decree, shall certify and forward a copy of the decree to that court or per-
i . 
[istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 17. 
8-45c-18. Tak ing testimony of persons in o ther s ta tes . In addition to other 
icedural devices available to a party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian 
litem or other representative of the child may adduce testimony of witnesses, 
luding parties and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state. The 
irt on its own motion may direct that the testimony of a person be taken in 
)ther state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which 
\ testimony shall be taken. 
listory: L. 1980, ch. 41, §18. 
f8-45c-19. Request to cour t of ano the r s ta te to take e v i d e n c e , to make 
idies or to order appearance of pa r ty — Payment of costs. (1) A court of 
s state may request the appropriate court of another state to hold a hearing 
adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give evidence under other proce-
res of that state, or to have social studies made with respect to the custody of 
:hild involved in proceedings pending in the court of this state; and to forward 
the court of this state certified copies of the transcript of the record of the hear-
l, the evidence otherwise adduced, or any social studies prepared in compliance 
th the request. The cost of the services may be assessed against the parties. 
2) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state 
of the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be assessed agains 
another party or will otherwise be paid. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 19. 
78-45c-20. Tak ing evidence for use in cour t of ano the r s ta te — Orderinj 
appea rance in ano the r state — Enforcement — Costs. (1) Upon request of th 
court of another state the courts of this state which are competent to hear custod; 
matters may order a person in this state to appear at a hearing to adduce evidenc 
or to produce or give evidence under other procedures available in this state. I 
certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing or the evidence other 
wise adduced shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court to the requesting court. 
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give his testimony or statemen 
in this state for use in a custody proceeding outside this state. 
(3) Upon request of the court of another state a competent coqrt of this stat 
may order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a custod 
proceeding in another state. The court may condition compliance wi^h the reques 
upon assurance by the other state that travel and other necessary expenses wi 
be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has physical custody, of the chil 
cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it appears the order will be ineffec 
tive, the court may issue a warrant of arrest against such person to secure hi 
appearance with the child in the other state. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §20. 
78-45c-21. Preserva t ion of records of proceedings — Furn i sh ing copies t 
o ther s ta te cour ts . In any custody proceeding in this state the court shall preserv 
the pleadings, orders and decrees, any record that has been made of its hearing 
social studies, and other pertinent documents until the child reaches 18 years ( 
age. Upon appropriate request of the court of another state the court shall forwar 
to the other court certified copies of any or all of such documents. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §21. 
78-45c-22. Request ing cour t records from ano the r s ta te . If a custody decrt 
has been rendered in another state concerning a child involved in a custody pr< 
ceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of this state upon taking jurisdii 
tion of the case shall request of the court of the other state a certified copy < 
the transcript of any court record and other documents mentioned in sectio 
78-45c-21. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §22. 
78-45c-23. Foreign countries — Application of genera l policies. The gener, 
policies of this act extend to the international area. The provisions of this act rela 
ing to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other states app' 
to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to cu 
tody rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable notice ar 
opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 23. 
78-45c-24. Pr io r i ty on cour t calendar . Upon the request of a party to a cu 
tody proceeding which raises a question of existence or exercise of jurisdictk 
„r,r}ar. th\a 0M fho oudo ahuU hp ir'wpn calendar orioritv and handled expeditiously. 
le court or a party to the action upon order of the court. 
(2) Orders of the court for pa r t i e s or persons to appear before the court in 
:cordance with the terms of this act shall include legal and sufficient service of 
•ocess in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 
•dered for good cause shown. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 25. 
78-45c-26. Shor t t i t le. This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child Cus-
dy Jurisdiction Act." 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 26. 
ffective Date. 
Section 27 of Laws 1980, ch. 41 provided: 
'his act shall take effect on July 1, 1980." 
P A R T V 
J U R O R S 
hap te r 
5-46. J u r y Selection and Service Act. 
C H A P T E R 46 
JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT 
ction 
-46-1. Short title. 
-46-2. Jurors selected from random cross section — Opportunity and obligation to serve. 
-46-3. Discrimination prohibited. 
-46-4. Definitions. 
-46-5. Number of trial jurors. 
-46-6. Alternate trial jurors — Selection — Duties and function. 
•46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors. 
46-8. Determination on juror qualification — Persons not competent to serve as jurors. 
46-9. Jury commissioners — Appointment — Term — Qualifications •— Compensation 
— Vacancy. 
46-10. Master list maintained by jury commission — Public examination — Lists used 
in compiling master list available to jury commission. 
46-11. Master jury wheel — Selection of names to put in jury wheel. 
46-12. Drawing prospective juror names from master wheel — Juror qualification form 
— Content — Completion — Penalties for failure to complete or misrepresenta-
tion — Joint jury wheel for court authorized. 
46-13. Drawing juror panels — Notice to jurors — Procedure when shortage of jurors 
drawn — Public inspection of names drawn and content of qualification forms 
— Exception. 
46-14. Qualified prospective jurors not exempt from jury service. 
46-15. Excuse from jury service. 
46-16. Jury not selected in conformity with act — Procedure to challenge — Relief availa-
ble. 
46-17, Preservation of records and papers. 
46-18. Compensation and travel expenses of jurors. 
46-19. Limitations on jury service. 
46-20. Penalties for failure to appear or complete jury service. 
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tuting grand jury. 
78-46-23. Court administrator's duties and responsibilities. 
78-46-1. Short t i t le. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "J 
Selection and Service Act." 
History: C. 1953, 78-46-1, enacted by L. Title of Act. 
1979, ch. 130, § 1. An act repealing and reenacting cha] 
46, title 78, Utah Code Annotated 1953, re 
Compiler s Notes. - n g tQ j u r i e s ; p r o v i d i n g t h e m a n n e r in wl 
Laws 1979, ch. 130, § 1 repealed old sections jurors are called, establishing jury comr 
78-46-1 to 78-46-33 (R.S. 1898, §§ 1291 to 1316,
 s io ners and defining their duties; provic 
1318 to 1323; L. 1905, ch. 15, § 1; 1905, ch. 102, j u r 0 r qualifications, exemptions and pr< 
§ 1; C.L. 1907, §§ 1291 to 1316, 1318 to 1323;
 ciures for challenging jury selection methi 
CL. 1917, §§3591 to 3616, 3618 to 3623; L. providing the method for selecting gr 
1925, ch. 18, § 1; 1925, ch. 19, § 1; 1929, ch. 87, j u r i e s ; establishing sanctions for failure 
§ 1; U.S. 1933, 40-0-1 to 40-0-33; L. 1933, ch. comply with requirements of the act; pre 
36, §1; 1933 (2nd S.S.), ch. 11, §1; C. 1943, j n g sanctions and penalties for employ 
40-0-1 to 40-0-33; L. 1947, ch. 65, §§ 1, 2; 1949,
 w n o discharge employees summoned for j 
ch. 59, § 1; 1949, ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 209, § 4; service; and providing a severability clai 
1967, ch. 221, §1; 1971, ch. 44, §2; 1971 (1st _
 L aws 1979, ch. 130. 
S S.), ch. 8, § 1; 1977, ch. 77, §§ 70 to 73; 1977, 
ch. 140, §4; 1977, ch. 144, §§ 1, 2), relating to Law Reviews. 
the selection and qualifications of jurors, and Utah Legislative Survey — 1979, 1980 U 
enacted new sections 78-46-1 to 78-46-23. LMtev. 155. 
78-46-2. J u r o r s selected from random cross section — O p p o r t u n i t y a 
obligation to serve. It is the policy of this state that persons selected for ji 
service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of i 
area served by the court, and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity 
accordance with this act to be considered for jury service and have the obligat 
to serve as jurors when summoned for tha t purpose. 
History: C. 1953, 78-46-2, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1979, ch. 130, § 1. p o r repeal and re-enactment of this s 
tion, see Compiler's Notes under 78-16-1. 
78-46-3. Discrimination prohibi ted. A citizen shall not be excluded or exen 
from jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ei 
nomic status. 
History: C. 1953, 78-46-3, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1979, ch. 130, § 1. p o r repeal and re-enactment of this s 
tion, see Compiler's Notes under 78-46-1. 
78-46-4. Definitions. (1) "Jury" means a body of persons temporarily select 
from the citizens of a particular county invested with power to present and ind 
a person for a public offense, or to try a question of fact. 
(2) "Grand jury" means a body of seven persons selected from the citizens 
a particular county before a court of competent jurisdiction and sworn to inqui 
into public offenses committed or triable within the county. 
(3) "Trial jury" means a body of persons selected from the citizens of a partic 
lar county before a court or offices of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to try a 
determine by verdict a question of fact. 
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J A N :<; 8 Kiil.U 
IN THE^SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGS, 
Petitioner, 
v, 





Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and 
communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly 
and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to 
the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporane-
ous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the 
children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction 
therein; the court having further communicated with the appropri-
ate judge of Bex Elder County District Court; now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court 
finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject to 
this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Box Elder County District Court of the State 
of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously,-
 A<? 
exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceed-
ings; and that one of the named parties, father of the children, 
continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon commur 
tion with said court it has elected and determined to cont 
exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Chi 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that 
Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues 
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody 
visitation of the parties1 children, the parties not havinc 
agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington a 
there being no emergency justifying intervention in the mat 
by Washington Courts; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings c 
cerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed unt 
further order of the court or until an appropriate motion fi 
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and 
proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of s 
orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder Cour 
District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisio 
the UCCJA. 
Dated and signed in open this / -^  of January, 1986 
Stephen Caddis 
STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIC 
ORDER - 2 
t'tb 1 n />— 
& SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON 
m COUNTY OF KING 
"1 
OP-/ fZ(\M L-l/OG-l Petitioner, 
vs . 
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ORDER ON FAMILY LAW MOTION 
bove-entitled court, having heard a mo t i n n -frfv Ytf(/C\<Z\r)f*'&.blrtl 
HEREBY npnrprn ^ ? W ^ / ' f *U V W - * / V - / V f X i ^ U s ^ ^ U * 
/ Z * 2 -
NTED BY: 
., 19lA. 
/ / N //couRf COMMISSIONER 
ney f o r 
ney f o r . 

















'• i . . . . • *»• J / 
Copy 
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:?' vf^TCLF'.t: JAN 
SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY 
In Re the Marriage of: 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGS, 
Petitioner, 
and 



















|i THIS MATTER having come on regularly to be heard beiore the 
|| undersigned Court Commissioner upon the Motion of Petitioner, and 
!; the Petitioner appearing personally and by her a"crney, Ralph 
'i Thompson, Jr., ?.S. of Sonkin, Thompson & Klein, and "the 
• Respondent aooearing/not aooearing, and the Court having 
considered the records and files herein, including the Declaration 
: \r : ~ ~ — : - > : ^ . _ :__ v. .* ^.i --. — "U ~ — ~ " ~ ->T.-- — ~m /£**?3"1* ***** 
z A "7^  
j| . At the time of my telephone conference with the Utah judge, 
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By: -HTl i^^y3^M^< fr«^ 
Ralph Thompson, J r . , $?.S. 
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